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LAWYERS AND CIVILIZATION *
ANTRONY LEWIS t
My theme was suggested by a small book that takes a pessimistic
view of the future of civilization. It says "the fateful question" is
whether men can master "the human instinct of aggression and self-
destruction." For they "have gained control over the forces of nature
to such an extent that . . . they would have no difficulty in exterminat-
ing one another to the last man. They know this, and hence comes a
large part of their current unrest, their unhappiness and their mood
of anxiety."
The passage sounds like one of those studies of man in the nuclear
age. In fact it is from the concluding paragraph of Sigmund Freud's
Civilization and Its Discontents,' written in 1930. Looking around
him in Europe then, Freud had as strong a reason for putting the hands
of humanity's clock at three minutes to midnight as the Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists did in 1945. Aggression and self-destruction are not
characteristic of only one period in human history, or one stage in
technological development, or one set of economic arrangements.2
Anyone who claims to have invented a particular social or eco-
nomic arrangement that will assure enlightened human behavior de-
serves our skepticism. Civilization will always be at risk from the
inner nature of its creator, man. Nevertheless, we clearly make matters
* This Article is based on the Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture, delivered
March 2, 1972, under the auspices of the Pennsylvania Chapter of the Order of the
Coif, the Law Alumni Society, and the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
tColumnist, New York Times (London Bureau). A.B. Harvard College, 1948.
1 S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 82 (rev. ed. 1963).
2We may note in passing with what prescient skepticism Freud viewed the
Marxist notion that man's aggressiveness is caused by the institution of property.
In 1930, before Stalin's terror, he wrote: "One only wonders, with concern, what the
Soviets will do after they have wiped out their bourgeois." Id. 52.
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better or worse by the way we organize our societies. We can increase
or lessen the external strains and, with them, the individual's ability to
deal with his own aggression. A person living under hateful conditions
is not likely, unless he is a saint, to be at peace with himself. Freud
saw the evolution of civilization as a struggle between what he called
Eros and Death, the instincts of life and of destruction. We may find
his terms difficult; but accepting them for the moment, we could say
that man's inescapable duty is to struggle for social arrangements that
will encourage in the largest number of individuals the instinct of life.
I. SOURCES OF PRESENT ANXIETIES
Today many would say that we live in an age of extreme dis-
content, of fear for the future of civilization. There is always a danger
of thinking one's own time uniquely dangerous. Mary Renault, draw-
ing on her knowledge of the ancient world, has warned against this
fallacy. In the Stone Age, she says, when isolated human settlements
perished of hunger or disease, the last survivor "must have believed
himself the last of his kind in all the universe. Our imagination today
can scarcely grasp the horror of these lonely deaths." '
It is a nice question whether it would be more horrible to face
death in the ignorant loneliness of a Stone Age survivor or in the bitter
knowledge of anyone who survived a nuclear or ecological catastrophe
in our century. Suffice it to say that there are powerful reasons now
for those who are part of the developed world's civilization to feel it
threatened. I shall suggest a number of those reasons-by no means
an exhaustive list.
The oncoming crisis of the natural environment is for me the first
source of discontent. Mary Renault's savage feared the infinite; we are
learning to fear the finite. We have suddenly realized, those who have
thought about it, that life is sustained by a thin crust of earth and air
and water-an environment by no means infinite and already pressed
near its limits by industrial society. That awareness shatters tranquility.
If we do not shrink from the knowledge, we must recognize that the
explosive economic "growth" and "progress" of the last century have
been based on a fraud. They are not a self-sustaining process but one
dependent on plunder of limited environmental resources. One hardly
needs to be a scientist to notice the consequent strains now, the pres-
sures of population, the loss of beauty and amenity. There can be dis-
pute about this figure or that, but only the ignorant or the foolish can
believe any longer in the dream of a world with two cars in every
3 Renault, The Survivor and the Hero, ENCOUNTER, Dec. 1971, at 94.
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garage. We shall survive only by the most heroic change in the ethos
of our civilization, from growth to stability, from wasting to conserving.
In politics as in the environment there is a sense of things being
out of control. We live in a world of juggernauts-aggregations of
scientific and industrial and military power so huge and so remote from
us that we wonder whether any government can regulate them. Doubt,
even despair, is understandable when the citizen finds that a democratic
system apparently provides no way of stopping an unwanted war. If
our political leaders do not or cannot stand up to the road-builders and
the concrete-manufacturers, can we have confidence in their will or
ability to stop the mad accumulation of weapons of mass destruction?
As the problems grow larger, the politicians seem smaller. Does despair
somehow breed political mediocrity, or is that only an illusion, a trick
effect? The difficulty of control may arise not only from concentrated
power but from a phenomenon at the other end of the contemporary
scale: the triumph, especially in the United States, of the revolution of
individualism. There is no turning back now from the idea of individual
responsibility and freedom; we cannot again merge our identity with
that of king or priest. But there does seem to be a price. A society
without the cohesion of shared beliefs, with little deference to rank or
tradition, can be an undisciplined society, selfish, even corrupt to judge
by what we are learning about American law enforcement these days.
Certainly it is a society difficult to govern.
A third area of concern, after the environmental and political, is
the economic. Here again liberal optimism has been confounded. The
Western World has had a period of spectacular prosperity and growth.
But the result in human terms, even putting the ecological problem aside
entirely, has been less than satisfactory. We might have expected on
the one hand more individual contentment from private prosperity, on
the other a better social infrastructure from public investment. We
have neither. We have a society of lonely people who know that pos-
sessions have not made them happy yet remain so greedy for more that
they feed inflation and keep public life in a state of squalor. Nor has
our prosperity been used to narrow the socially destructive gap between
rich and poor. The distribution of income is no more egalitarian than
it was in the bad old days. The rich grow richer, and some of the
richest still pay less of their income in taxes than the rest of us. What
is one to say of a country in which hundreds of thousands of people do
not have enough to eat but a single family reports spending $4.6 million
to elect one of its own governor of New York? 4 A hundred years after
Disraeli we still do not understand that allowing two nations to exist
4N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1970, at 24, col. 3.
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within a society threatens the whole. But it is not only the discontent
of those most deprived that should worry the United States; all of us
are damaged by a system devoted to the promotion of personal wealth.
Finally, among the reasons for concern, I mention some social and
psychological disappointments. For American liberals the most im-
mediate is the state of relations between black and white. Gunnar
Myrdal, when he published An American Dilemma in 1944, spoke of
the Negro problem as both America's greatest failure and her greatest
opportunity. We had only to follow the "deepest convictions" of our
moral history and end discrimination, he said, to increase our well-being
at home and our prestige abroad immensely. "America can demon-
strate that justice, equality and cooperation are possible between white
and colored people." ' We shared that optimism and thought the nec-
essary process of change had begun in 1954. It had, but race turned
out to be an immensely more complicated question than we had under-
stood. Nowadays some would even doubt Myrdal's admiring assump-
tion about America's "deepest convictions." We have been told by an
official commission that the white majority has an intractably racist
strain in its attitudes.6  Many whites, for their part, understandably
fear black racism. The whole question of race has become mixed up
with the American social illnesses of crime, violence, and urban decay.
But racial hate and fear are not unique to the United States, nor is
disappointment at their continuing reality. Indeed, liberal thought
everywhere embodied the hope that as man freed himself from dogma
and took responsibility for his own actions, he would put aside the
intolerant cruelties of his history. To speak of that hope leaves a bitter
taste after the Nazi death camps and Stalin's terror. And those epi-
sodes have still not taught us enough. All over the world men continue
to torment one another for reasons of race or color or religion or politics
or ideas. Whites commit callous cruelties to blacks in South Africa;
Moslems kill Moslems of a different origin in Bengal; Christians hate
other Christians in Northern Ireland. In the Soviet Union the psychi-
atric ward has joined the Arctic labor camp as punishment for dissent.
Every continent has had its recent victims: Greece, Nigeria, Brazil,
Vietnam.
II. FoRMs OF REACTION: REJECTION OF REASON
It is an age of extremes: of prolific life and automated death, of
mass education and mass foolishness, of unexampled wealth and novel
forms of misery, of science that ennobles the human spirit and science
5 G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 1021 (rev. ed. 1964).
6 NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMIssioN ON CrvIL DISORDERS, REPORT 91 (1968).
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that could unravel all life. With due caution for the fallacy of gloom
about one's own time, I think those who live in the last third of the
Twentieth Century are entitled to feel that they live under extremely
testing conditions. At any rate many do believe it, and their belief has
consequences of its own. When people think their civilization is at the
edge, they may react in extreme ways.
One characteristic reaction of our day is a deadly violence of lan-
guage. We know the slogans: "burn, baby, burn," Jerry Rubin's "kill
your parents" and a hundred others. I went to an Angela Davis rally
in London last year; because the tone of most discourse in London re-
mains so polite, the angry words in the hall made more impression than
they might here. The United States was called "a fascist military
state," its courts and legislatures determined on "genocide" of black
people. Such rhetoric is deadly in two senses of the word. First, it
numbs perception by its hyperbole; it clouds meaning; it strikes at the
purpose of language, communication. If one throws the word "fascist"
at the United States, where for all that is wrong there remains an as-
tonishing freedom of expression, what is there left to say about places
where repression really exists? How would one explain to Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn? But such violence of expression is not only costly to
truth but deadly in the sense of dangerous, because it encourages vio-
lence of spirit, violence in deed. The Nazis spoke their racial fantasy
before they acted it; so did the members of Southern lynch mobs.
It is an old illusion to conceive of the world as divided into good
and evil classes of beings. That makes life so simple. Instead of hav-
ing to think, the angry man simply identifies the enemy--capitalists,
Jews, "pigs"-and announces that utopia can be achieved by wiping
them out. Unfortunately, reality is more complicated, the distribution
of good and evil in humanity more subtle. How odd to have to say
that. It verges on the incredible that Manichean thought persists in
the face of awareness that aggression is a problem of individual psy-
chology, an instinct from which no group or person is exempt. It is
especially sad when young radicals mimic the emotional-ideological
generalizations of the past, only with different targets. We count on
them to understand better than previous generations that social prob-
lems involve human beings, complex creatures who cannot be lumped
together under slogans, and that problems are not solved by fantasies
of mass slaughter. But our culture is expert at producing fantasies.
Film techniques are so artful that they can turn violence into a poetry
of vision and sound.
In addition to the various ideological doctrines of absolute good
and evil, we have what could be called cults of irrationality. There are
19721
856 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
those who seek the answer in mysticism, as there have been in every
age. There are some who act out their aggressive dreams in bombing
or murder without rational motive. There are even those who in the
name of mental health preach the holiness of unreason. The pocket
Savonarolas of our day have numerous followers. It must be that, as
at the end of the Fifteenth Century, people mistake signs of deep
change in the organization and values of society for the approach of the
apocalypse.
In all these phenomena-the use of language as an assault, the ap-
peal of violence, the spread of mysticism and unreason-we may see
signs of an unwillingness to face the difficulties of social existence. It
is the old wish to resign from civilization because it is so trying: "Stop
the world, I want to get off," as the title of a Broadway musical has it.
Freud had a particularly piercing insight that is apposite here. Con-
fessing that he could not meet the desire of his fellow men for prophecy,
he said: "I can offer them no consolation: for at bottom that is what
they are all demanding-the wildest revolutionaries no less passionately
than the most virtuous believers." ' Consolation indeed.
The rejection of reason and moderation is not a new development
in Western thought. There is a romantic strain going far back that
sees man at his noblest when he lays thought aside for passion. The
archetype among political writers is Georges Sorel, who thrilled to both
the Bolshevik revolution and the rise of fascism.' What astonishes and
distresses many people is that the violent and the irrational should have
such wide appeal in an age when man has mastered technology, when
at last he can plan his existence. But that precisely misses the point:
What we have done in the name of reason inspires rebellion.
The society developed by the bureaucrats and the scientists and
the businessmen ought to give anyone ground for concern. We all
know how much empty commerce there is in it, how much vulgarity
and covetousness, how little moral purpose. The writers of books
about the repellent values of the consumer society have had the ironic
triumph of commercial success because they strike a sensitive chord in
ordinary people. But the indictment is more severe. For this supposed
century of the rational has produced crimes against the human spirit as
fearful as any in those past ages we call dark. Men who thought them-
selves civilized led two-year-old children by the hand to concentration
camp incinerators. Others have tried to advance Western ideals by
bombing a peasant society and poisoning its vegetation. The most con-
7 FREUD, supra note 1, at 82.
8 See Berlin, Creighton Lecture, reprinted in The Times (London), Dec. 31, 1971
(Literary Supplement), at 1617.
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ventional of us middle-aged, middle-class liberals should have learned a
great deal in the last few years about what can be done under the claim
of reason.9
The question is whether the failures of our society are an argument
against reason itself. Those who reject the notion of civilized order
are fortified in that view by the fact that they live after Freud and can
cite him on the importance of emotion in the life of man, the psycho-
logical cost of burying the instinctual passions. We must give full play
to the instinctive drives, they say, to the dark side of man, to the
unconscious.
But if the attempt is to enlist Sigmund Freud on the side of un-
reason, that is a farcical misreading of his teaching. The supposed
prophet of the unconscious said, in a letter to Albert Einstein: "The
ideal condition of things would of course be a community of men who
had subordinated their instinctual life to the dictatorship of reason." 10
Freud knew the power of emotion, of instinct, but his hope was that
reason would prevail. "The voice of the intellect is a soft one," he said,
"but it does not rest until it has gained a hearing. Ultimately, after
endlessly repeated rebuffs, it succeeds. This is one of the few points on
which one may be optimistic about the future of mankind . ... , "
Professor Richard Wollheim, to whose book on Freud I owe deep
acknowledgment, put it that Freud thought man's mind was swayed
by rational considerations "once it listens to them. But . . . he will,
when comfort demands it, do all he can not to listen to them. Freud's
life work, we might say, was a research into the deafness of the mind." 12
Freud's point was not that the unconscious should prevail but that
its existence should be recognized. He taught that no one can safely
deny the emotional life. He might have said that the civilized ideal is
reason, but that nothing deserves the name of reason unless it acknowl-
edges the emotions.
9 An outstanding recent example of unreason done in reason's name is illuminated
in this comment on Lyndon Johnson's memoirs:
It is extraordinary, and terrifying, that a President of the United States
can write hundreds of pages about a war he directed, discuss in detail dozens
of decisions to start and stop bombings for tactical and political reasons, and
give no sense that he knew these bombs killed people.
Dworkin, Book Review, 87 THE LISTENER 88, 89 (1972).
1022 S. FREUD, Why Warf, in STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHO-
LOGICAL WORKS 213 (1933). Freud indicated his view of ernotion's place in a rational
world:
Our best hope for the future is that intellect-the scientific spirit, reason-
may in process of time establish a dictatorship in the mental life of man.
The nature of reason is a guarantee that afterwards it will not fail to give
man's emotional impulses and what is determined by them the position they
deserve.
New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, id. 171.
11 S. FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION 93 (1955).
12 R. WOLLHErm, FREUD 234 (1971).
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Those who tell us that our assumptions must change are quite
right. If anything is clear, it is that more acquisitiveness will not solve
the problems of either contemporary society or its individual members.
But I find it hard to believe that the immense shifts required in values
and social organization will be brought about by grass growing up
through the sidewalks. I understand and indeed admire young people
who express their discontent with the acquisitive ethic by trying to work
abandoned farmland or make furniture. But if the most idealistic mem-
bers of the next generation give up on organized society, who will lead
the way to necessary change? I think also that there are dangers in
medievalism. I shall never forget a course I had at Harvard with
Gaetano Salvemini, a refugee from Mussolini's Italy, elderly, with a
white beard, but uncompromisingly passionate. The course was on the
Italian Renaissance. The first day, Salvemini noted that there had
lately been a revival of admiration for the Middle Ages, for medievalism.
He then read us a chronicle of the period before the Renaissance, the
diary of a monk who lived in perhaps the Eleventh Century. The monk
recorded what he saw around him in decaying Rome: plague, violence,
famine, finally people cutting up the dead for food. Salvemini looked
up, his eyes flashing, and said: "This was the middle ages: cannibal-
ism 1" We must take care that in rejecting an empty technological
society we are not misled by romance into savagery.
III. THE LAWYERS' ROLE: CONSCIENCE AND SOCIAL INSTRUMENT
My subject is Lawyers and Civilization. If you have followed this
far, you may feel that there has been a good deal of moody speculation
about one but nothing about the other. What have lawyers to do with
civilization and its discontents?
When Freud sought to define civilization, he spoke of techno-
logical accomplishment and the love of beauty. He mentioned cleanli-
ness, order, and respect for ideas. But "the decisive step of civilization,"
he said, was the replacement of brute force, the individual's power, by
"the power of a community." "3 And so he concluded that civilization's
first requisite was justice: that is, law administered impartially, for the
community's sake, without favor to any individual.
If law plays so critical a role in the civilizing of man, then in a time
of discontent about society, the doubts will inevitably go to law itself.
Sixty years ago, Holmes spoke of an "unrest that seems to wonder
vaguely whether law and order pay." 14 That is certainly one feature
13 FREUD, supra note 1, at 32.
14 O.W. HOLMES, Law and the Court, in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 169 (1962).
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of our distempered age. I think again of that London rally for Angela
Davis. One of the speakers talked of the crime that Miss Davis was
charged with assisting, the seizure of a California judge at gunpoint.
The speaker praised the kidnappers for not having been "deterred by
the mystique of the courtroom itself." Others shouted, "power to the
people."
"Power to the people." Would minorities in the United States
really benefit from a populist system without respect for law, without
the restraints of the Constitution? Would they be better off without
"the mystique of the courtroom ?" They ought to shudder at the idea.
American history has enough cruelties on its pages. How much worse
they would have been if there were no limits-limits enforced by law-
on the power of the majority to stamp out unpopular views and treat
particular groups as outcasts.
A lawyer, one who calls himself radical, wrote recently: "[I]n the
last analysis, due process of law is exactly what the high and mighty
say it is." "5 That statement could be taken as a mere truism, because
our constitutional ideas of due process are defined from time to time by
a handful of highly-placed judges. But plainly the author meant more;
in the phrase "high and mighty" he was suggesting that judges are
mere mouthpieces for the dominant forces in American society. Of
course law and the courts have played a repressive role in the United
States from time to time. Of course Supreme Court justices have not
always been progressive-minded: far from it. But with all that, I put
it to you that the radical lawyer's statement is concentrated nonsense.
For a very long time, as we measure history these days, American
courts have been vindicating rights that could hardly be called the pro-
gram of the reactionary power-brokers. As long ago as 1925 the
Supreme Court defined "due process of law" to protect freedom of
speech."0 Was that the cynical wish of the high and mighty? Was it
when the Court in the 1930's upheld the right of Communists to as-
semble freely, 7 or of extremists to publish an anti-semitic newspaper? 18
Was it, in the same period, when the Court said that a criminal convic-
tion based on a coerced confession did not provide due process of law? 19
When it held that the due process clause guaranteed free counsel to poor
15 Kunstler, Open Resistance: In Defense of the Movement, in LAw AGAINST THE
PEOPLE 267, 268 (R. Lefcourt ed. 1971).
The eventual acquittal of Angela Davis at trial could be regarded as a comment
on the whole thesis that law is only what those who hold political power in society
want it to be.
16 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
17 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
Is Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
19 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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criminal defendants? 20 Or when, in the 1930's, it began the long series
of cases establishing that segregated public education denied the equal
protection of the laws? 21 All this was before anyone considered the
Court an instrument of liberal reform.
Even the failures of the Supreme Court on issues of civil liberty
may serve a purpose. The majority was insensitive to the claim of free
speech during World War I, but we remember Holmes on free trade in
ideas.22 Another majority found no constitutional limits whatever to
official wiretapping, but we remember-and a later court applied-
Brandeis' warning that "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in in-
sidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without under-
standing." 2
The point missed by the radical critic is that the process of consti-
tutional adjudication, whatever the result, focuses attention on moral
considerations. There are closed minds in the Supreme Court on this
issue or that. But on the whole it is a more open forum, more subject
to persuasion, less moved by money or influence than any other insti-
tution of government. Anyone who sits in that courtroom and watches
even briefly must be impressed by the simplicity of access, the directness
of the process, the very real consideration given to interests that have
little power in the material world. The Court listened to blacks when
Congress did not, and to Communists, and to pornographers. Would
prisoners under death sentence be more likely to get a sympathetic hear-
ing today from a state governor or legislature or from the courts? It
would be very hard to convince me that the despised and rejected in
our society would be better off if we gave up our vision of law in
Freud's sense, one marked by detachment, and went over to what could
be called revolutionary justice, committed to particular interests.
The cynical view of American justice seems to me a corruption of
something healthy-the skepticism of the realist critics. Holmes taught
that law was not logic or eternal truth, as judges liked to pretend, but
the reflection of a people's experience and, sometimes, of a judge's con-
scious or unconscious sympathies. But from that insight he hardly
argued that impartiality or detachment were useless judicial objectives.
Quite to the contrary. He wanted all those involved in the law-making
20 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942), this holding was construed to require appointed counsel only in capital cases
or those posing special circumstances. Betts was overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), holding that indigent state criminal defendants were constitu-
tionally entitled to free counsel in all serious cases.
21 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
22 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
23 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
Ohnstead was subsequently overruled. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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process to become aware of their own biases--of the Can't Helps in
their makeup-so as to guard against being pushed too far by them.
I thought it was wrong, during the years of the Warren Court,
when some civil libertarians urged the majority to press its views with-
out a sense of restraint or moderation. One law professor asked
rhetorically whether we could imagine some future conservative justice
restraining his natural tendency to declare minimum wage laws uncon-
stitutional because, years before, Justice Frankfurter "had commend-
ably restrained himself from using the judicial power vigorously to
protect free speech." 24 He assumed that the answer had to be no, but
I think it is yes. I can imagine judges, liberal or conservative, con-
scientiously reflecting on history and their function and moderating a
view. Perhaps it is naive, but I continue to believe that Supreme Court
justices should have other objectives than advancing their private cer-
tainties in every case.
To confuse law and politics may have dangerous consequences.
Consider a somewhat grotesque example. Last summer the Supreme
Court of South Vietnam ruled Nguyen Cao Ky out of the presidential
election because, it found, he had not met the requirements of the elec-
tion law. But when only the incumbent president, Thieu, was left on
the ballot, that proved embarrassing to Mr. Thieu. The Court there-
upon reversed its decision and put Ky back in the race. Why? One
of the nine justices, when asked, said: "It was better to have two candi-
dates rather than one." 25
At just about the same time last summer, President Nixon was
being widely praised by liberal commentators for 6lan and decisiveness
in reversing his established positions on China and the economy. 20 Why,
then, did it seem so shocking, even absurd, for the South Vietnamese
court to reverse itself on prudential grounds? Because we expect some-
thing more of courts than pragmatism. We expect principle, an attempt
at rational persuasion-and if of course not perfect consistency, then at
least reasoned continuity. Change in judicial law should appear not as
an abrupt break with an inconvenient past but as the result of a process
of reconsideration required by reason and experience. I am convinced
that that concept of law fills a deep need in society and that we corrupt
it at our peril. Especially in this age, when tradition and authority are
so weak and the ties of community under such strain, we need law as a
source of authority deeper than temporary passions.
24 Black, Old and New Ways in Judicial Review, BoWDoIN COLLEGE Buu.., Mar.
1958, at 17.
25 N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1971, at 2, col. 1.
28 See, e.g., Shenker, Galbraith Corrects Galbraith's Errors, N.Y. Times, Aug.
25, 1971, at 39, col. 7.
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One more word on radicalism and law. We have lately had a
political trial in which law became theater-the theater of the absurd.
Lawyers joined their clients in showing disregard for the system by
heaping indignities upon the judicial process. There had been extreme
provocation: I have no doubt of that. But I fail to see how the damage
done by a malicious judge could be cured by defendants and their coun-
sel behaving like delinquent schoolboys. The answer to unreason in a
courtroom is not more unreason. Nor is that the courageous course,
as some would have it who romanticize the affair. Both courage and
wisdom would have lain in responding to indignity by dignity. Lawyers
should be the last people to indicate, by example, that disorder is likely
to increase the sum of human wisdom. And lawyers as well as judges
might think humility a quality worth cultivating. It is only fair to add
that some pillars of the bar, in focusing upon defense counsel's behavior
at the Chicago trial, show a certain one-sidedness. The judge's per-
formance was at least as worthy of attention, and it would have been
reassuring to see the organized bar showing concern about it at a very
early stage.
It must also be said that there are some things more important
than decorum in a courtroom. Decorum no doubt conduces toward the
better administration of justice. But it is not a substitute for, nor
should it be confused with, justice itself. The observer at a South
African political trial will see how decorous and courteous the proceed-
ings are, but how relevant is that to the justice of the judge's verdict
or to the law he applies to reach it?
When the American Bar Association met in London last summer,
much admiration was expressed for the decorum of English trials: the
civility of counsel, the expertness of judges, the speed of proceedings.
It is quite true that the scene in the law courts on the Strand is swift
and orderly by our standards. The American profession would do well
to emulate the competence of English trials and the dignity of their
setting. But it would be quite another thing to suggest, as I thought I
heard implied last summer, that Americans should take over the atti-
tudes of the English bench and bar in general.
The admirable decorum in the English profession is accompanied
by a less desirable remoteness from the concerns and passions of ordi-
nary life. Not only in Dickens' courtroom is there the sense of a faint
sneer, of a disdain for humanity. The English bar, with perhaps two
thousand practicing members, is a club; judges are a more refined inner
group. They are naturally not uniform, but as a generality it is not
unfair to suggest that the English bench and bar seem to regard the
rest of the world as something unkempt and more than a little nasty,
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something to be kept at a distance. If that appears a harsh judgment
from a foreigner, I give you the words of Lord Goodman, a distin-
guished member of the solicitors' branch of the English profession:
"The Bar," he said, "has a coy terror of the human race." 27
The remoteness of English lawyers enables them to remain quite
detached from the interests of their clients. That has great advantages:
it protects a barrister from ostracism if he represents an unpopular
client. But I think that is only possible because law in general in
Britain is kept so distant from public issues. Courts hardly ever pass
on social or political questions of the kind that are regularly framed in
lawsuits in the United States. When a man wants to change the sys-
tem of legislative representation or of race relations, he does not consult
a lawyer. Nor do British lawyers play the same critical role as Ameri-
cans in the affairs of business, labor unions, political parties, and gov-
ernment bodies.
Because the function of the American lawyer is different, he cannot
be expected to have the same degree of detachment. Perhaps in theory
one ought to be able to argue a case about the fourteenth amendment
and capital punishment with the same detachment as one about a com-
mercial contract. But in the real world, lawyers who are engaged in
great social and political issues must be more committed than would be
appropriate in the Strand. I do not regret that. I feel as Professor
Benjamin Kaplan of Harvard evidently did after a year in London ob-
serving that legal system. "The American scene is disordered," he
wrote, "but it is lively." 28
The larger question is whether it is a good thing for American
law and lawyers to have the social function that they do. In Britain
there are other means, notably a responsive Parliament, for dealing
with the public discontents that are part of a lawyer's life here. I think
doubts are growing among the British about the adequacy of the parlia-
mentary forum. But in any case history rules out a narrowing of the
lawyer's function in this country. We have come to rely too heavily on
the law as a medium of social change. If we were suddenly to remit the
discontented now to Congress and the state legislatures, the result could
only be more frustration and social explosion.
After the bar meeting in London I wrote a column 29 suggesting
that, in all the ceremonies of that occasion, the British could not have
got a real sense of the extraordinary role of law in the United States-
its function as conscience and social instrument. I mentioned the
2769 The Law Society's Gazette (London), No. 1, at 10 (1972).
28 Kaplan, An American Lawyer in the Queen's Courts: Impressions of English
Civil Procedure, 69 MIcHa. L. REv. 821, 837 (1971).
29 Lewis, The Profession of Law, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1971, at 25, col. 1.
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radiating influence of a written constitution regularly reinterpreted by
judges. I said that American legal education was much more chal-
lenging than English, the law schools a greater source of public ideas
and public servants. I recalled Charles Evans Hughes fighting for the
rights of socialists in 1921, and I noted some of the reforming and cru-
sading movements of our day: poverty law, with its challenge to social
assumptions; the consumer movement and its widening influence, in-
spired by Ralph Nader; the legal criticism of American war-making in
Vietnam, led by men such as Francis T. P. Plimpton.
That column evoked a letter to the editor from Lois Smallwood of
Bethesda, Maryland. "We who live down here on Main Street do not
recognize the lawyer Mr. Lewis describes," she wrote.
Yes, we have a Ralph Nader, but at least 200,000 of his
fellow lawyers have not yet achieved his level of moral de-
velopment.
Yes, Charles Evans Hughes did show moral courage in
1921. Some unknown thousands did not..
Yes, Francis Plimpton does stand solidly against the
Vietnam war, but a majority of the bar and judiciary have
made no such public commitment ...
Where was the organized bar and judiciary in the red-
baiting days of the 1950's?
[Mr. Lewis] has looked at the few great spirits who
spend a lifetime swimming upstream against the apathy,
greed, arrogance and almost total lack of social responsibility
in their profession.8"
I am more optimistic than Mrs. Smallwood about American
lawyers and about America. It remains a remarkably open society,
one that can change. Just consider the racial question. There are still
terrible disadvantages in being black, and no one can deny the existence
of fear and hatred on both sides. But only someone who forgets where
we were twenty years ago can deny the fact of progress. A recent
survey showed nearly fifty percent of Southern whites in favor of inte-
grated schools."' It is not utopia, but it is dramatic evidence of change
in attitudes.
Most of the change in race relations has been brought about by
law. In this and other fields a public role has been played not only by
the occasional great figure at the bar but increasingly by young lawyers
and law students. The other day a young man from Tennessee told me
80 N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1971, at 22, col. 5.
31 Greeley & Sheatsley, Attitudes Toward Racial Integration, SCIENTIFIc AmERI-
CAN, Dec. 1971, at 13, 14.
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about a local effort to make absentee owners of coal land in a poor valley
pay a fair share of taxes and take responsibility for the effects of strip
mining. Listening to him, I thought how characteristically American
the story was. That kind of community legal crusade simply does not
exist in Britain.
But still I wonder about Mrs. Smallwood. Is she wrong in saying
that much of the American legal profession is sunk in apathy and greed?
I remember when those trying to carry out the law of the land on race
relations were met in some areas by official intimidation and perversion
of the legal process itself; the organized bar did at length respond to
that challenge, but only after much doubt and delay. How sensitive
and helpful a role has the bar played on the question of war crimes in
Vietnam, surely one of the most important tests this country's fidelity
to law has ever faced? When the Supreme Court was under know-
nothing attack in the late 1950's and 1960's, why did the organized bar
sit silently by-or even join in the unworthy criticism? 32 Mrs. Small-
wood's doubts are not so easily put at rest.
The American legal profession has a duty to civilization. We
cannot expect a company of heroes; the profession is too large and
heterogeneous for that. But as a body it has a social responsibility that
it will not be allowed to shirk. We depend too much on law, as a look
back at our discontents will show.
If we had to characterize all the felt concerns of civilization today
in a single phrase, I think we would speak of a sense of disintegration
or, conversely, of a yearning for wholeness. In the natural world there
is the fear that we have broken the life-sustaining circle of growth and
decay and renewal. In the political society there is a loss of community:
at the same time an atomization of groups into lonely individuals and
a growth of remote power centers. In social and economic terms we
feel a dangerous lack of wholeness, for people excluded from the benefits
of a civilization on account of race or poverty or some other character-
istic are unlikely to have much stake in civilized behavior. And finally
there is concern for the wholeness, the integrity, of the individual.
When any American citizen is abused by authority, or for that matter
any Czech or Irishman, we are all diminished.
To list those concerns is to make clear the relevance to them of law
and lawyers, especially in the United States. American law has focused
to a remarkable degree in recent years on issues of social and individual
integrity. The greatest single reforming effort has been the struggle
32 See, e.g., Resolutions and Report of the Special Committee on Communist
Tactics, Strategy and Objectives, 84 REP. OF THE Am. BAR Ass'N 607 (1959). A
committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, it should be noted,
criticized this report. 14 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 241 (1959).
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to end racial separation in American society. Now attention has begun
to turn to the rights of the poor as a class.33 We can be sure that eco-
logical concerns will follow, that the law will be used in attempts to
make particular economic interests give way to a larger public interest
in restoring the circle of nature. In politics, the courts have acted
dramatically to restore the integrity of the system by insisting that
democratic assemblies be representative." And of course the theme
running through all the Supreme Court's criminal law decisions that
have aroused so much controversy-on confessions,35 the right to coun-
sel,36 search and seizure,37 and the like-is the need to protect the in-
tegrity of the human spirit. This reforming thrust of American law
and courts is not going to die away. On the contrary, I put it to you
that there will be increasing reliance on the legal process to deal with
the forces threatening civilization. Society is losing confidence these
days in the ability of governments to govern, and for good reason.
Central authorities in this and other countries simply are not able to
cope with the most obvious and serious problems; political will seems to
be failing. In that situation the advocates of change will inevitably
look for means outside of politics, and one path is the law. Judge
Wyzanski wrote recently of his concern about the rising burden on the
courts. Like it or not, he said, they will have to be prepared to resolve
more social issues. "A passionate reformer," he said, faces "inertia,
hostility and incompetence if he takes his cause to Congress or the
Executive departments," but he can with "ease" get his plea heard in
court.3" So there he will go.
If the courts to some extent do replace Congress and the Executive
as instruments of change, there may be a paradox for critics of the
judicial function. One critical line, from Thayer through Holmes and
Brandeis and Frankfurter, has argued that courts serve democracy by
leaving the principal issues for decision by the political branches of
government. But those critics were also believers in federalism, in the
diffusion of power. At a time when state governments are increasingly
impotent, when the democratic political process is often blocked, one
effective way of diffusing power is arguably to let issues work their
way through the legal system, for that leaves some initiative to local,
33 See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (state courts must enter-
tain civil divorce actions by impoverished persons without requiring payment of filing
fees).
34 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
35 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
36 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
37 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
38 Letter from Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Senior United States District Judge,
District of Massachusetts, to the author, Jan. 31, 1972.
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community, and private interests. One thinks that Brandeis, the in-
candescent advocate of federalism, would have seen it that way in
today's situation.
But law is not a mere substitute for politics. Law has its own
qualities and must be true to itself. For me the essential quality is a
concern for process, not just results. Freud said the first requisite of
civilization was justice, meaning an assurance that the rules would be
applied to all without favor. I would phrase it slightly differently,
though perhaps I mean the same. I think a civilized society is one that
cares about means as well as ends.
If we look at the United States today, do we not sense, underneath
all the disappointment and frustration over particular matters, an aching
doubt about the mechanisms of our society and their integrity? It is
not just the American lives lost in Vietnam that trouble us, or the dam-
age we have done there in a dubious cause. It is the feeling that our
leaders took us into Vietnam, and have kept us there, by concealing or
distorting the truth. It is not only the discovery that American soldiers
massacred women and children that horrifies us; it is our awareness
now that nowhere in the entire machinery of command, from the field
through the Pentagon to the President, was there enough courage,
enough faithfulness to our proclaimed belief in law, to accept moral
responsibility for uncovering and punishing the crimes. There is a
domestic parallel in the killings at Kent State. The horror of those
deaths is almost exceeded by the corrupt cynicism of the authorities,
state and federal, in failing to seek the truth about them. In law en-
forcement generally there are worrying signs of the doctrine that the
end justifies the means: the use of the investigative process to intimi-
date, 9 the official claim of a constitutional power to tap telephones with-
out any effective restraint.4" The men of zeal may win applause in the
short run when they break the law in the name of enforcing it. But
eventually, as Brandeis said in the wiretapping case, that "pernicious
doctrine" must bring "terrible retribution." 41 In Americans' concern
for the honor of their institutions the retribution may be there already.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nations, like individuals, should know themselves. The price of
ignorance is folly, and sometimes destruction. Perhaps here we can
see a special role for lawyers. If Freud's life work was research into
the deafness of the mind, then in a society as pervaded by law as ours
39 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1971, at 95, col. 4 ("F.B.I. Investigates Schorr
of C.B.S.").
40United States v. United States Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971).
41 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
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we count on lawyers to attack the national deafness-that is, to strip
away the illusions that are comfortable but obstruct reason.
I suggest twin models for that function: Freud and Holmes. They
doubtless seem an odd pair to put together, the Viennese Jewish doctor
and the Olympian Yankee lawyer, but they shared something funda-
mental: a belief in reason moderated by an awareness, after looking into
themselves, of the imperfectibility of man.
They were both in a sense Victorians, born into a strongly
moralistic tradition. Both surmounted that background and then, with
singular courage, went through terrible personal struggles to achieve
at length a skeptical serenity. For Holmes the first test was war. 2 He
survived three grave wounds in the Civil War, an experience that played
its part in shaping his lifelong state of doubt about men's certainties.
As a judge he insisted on looking for concealed motivations in his own
and others' truths; he called them "can't helps" and said truth could be
defined as "the system of my (intellectual) limitations." 43 At the age
of eighty-seven he rejected pacifism but was able to say, against a
majority of his colleagues, that a pacifist should not be excluded from
American citizenship because she believed "more than some of us do in
the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount." 41 Freud had to overcome
Vienna's contempt for his race and for his ideas. 5 He put himself
through a heroic effort of self-analysis that confirmed his findings on
infant sexuality. Finally, amidst increasingly difficult political circum-
stances, he struggled for fifteen years against a wasting illness. Yet
both men, through all their internal doubts and external troubles, main-
tained a faith in reason-in civilization. Holmes, speaking of the
future sixty years ago, foresaw racial turmoil and spoke of a "fear that
we are running through the world's resources at a pace we cannot keep."
But he ended that prophecy with the hope that "man may have cosmic
destinies that he does not understand. And so beyond the vision of
battling races and an impoverished earth I catch a dreaming glimpse
of peace." 41
Many would find it hard now to look to the future with the faith
of Holmes or with the courage of Freud, who relied on no faith except
belief in reason. There lies the great challenge to the profession of law.
Even as authority diminishes in every sphere--family, school, profes-
42 For the leading account of Holmes' early years, see M. HowE, JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS (1957), THE PROVING YEARS (1963).
43 O.W. HOLMES, Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310-11 (1920).
44 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (dissenting opinion).
4 5 See generally E. JONES, THE LIFE AND WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD (1957).
46 O.W. HOLMES, Law and the Court, in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 173 (1962).
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sion, politics-we still feel a deep yearning for order. But it must be
an order made tolerable by reason and humanity, not the order of the
grave. At a time of disturbance in nature and society and the indi-
vidual, the function of law must be to show that reason remains the best
hope of man. Every act in the name of law should ideally be an answer
to those who say law is nothing but the will of the high and mighty.
It is will, but will with the duty to understand and to persuade. The
lawyer's obligation is to the open mind. He must eternally try to square
the moral necessity for equality with the experienced need for diversity,
our craving for ordered tranquility with our irrepressible desire for free-
dom. It is no accident that those are the themes of American consti-
tutionalism. In this society I believe there is no higher calling than
the law.
